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A B S T R A C T
Since the 1990s, India invested more than one billion USD in participatory watershed development. Amongst
other interventions, the rehabilitation of small-scale water harvesting infrastructure is a main focus.
Nevertheless, despite its multiple economic and ecological beneﬁts, many communities fail to maintain the
structures. External support in this regard focuses largely on the promotion of blueprint solutions such as
community water funds or organizational capacity development of Water User Associations. Little attention is
paid to supporting the communities in developing rules related to the actual water and water infrastructure
management.
In this study we explored how experimental games closely framed to local conditions can help to better
understand coordination challenges and develop institutional capacities related to managing small village re-
servoirs in Rajasthan/India. We played artefactual public good experiments with 300 water managers and
combined the games with discussions. The approach created awareness for the cooperation challenges, fa-
cilitated debate related to possible solutions and helped to better understand cooperation patterns.
Our results suggest that participants were playing substantially better than the predictions of standard eco-
nomic theory but also substantially better than the behavior observed in real life. The discussions showed that
the players connected the game to their real life experiences. They highlighted challenges but also gave examples
where cooperation in the community is working well. The games allowed them to experiment in a compressed
way with diﬀerent institutions which deepened the discussion.
1. Introduction
Many irrigation systems, especially in developing countries, exhibit
characteristics of common pool resources (CPRs) and are managed as
common property. Often, a group jointly maintains infrastructure,
whereby the investment of each individual generates positive ex-
ternalities for the whole group. Standard economic theory predicts that
this leads to free riding behavior, and consequently, under-investment
in resource provision (Olson, 2009).
In Rajasthan, India, water has traditionally been stored on the sur-
face in minor irrigation dams and farm ponds which also recharge
shallow groundwater aquifers. There is strong evidence that such
structures have the potential to achieve a wide range of societal goals,
such as enhancing the provision of ecosystem services, increasing pro-
ductivity and generating diverse income opportunities (Raju and Shah,
2000; Kerr, 2002; Rockström et al., 2010; Garg et al., 2011, 2012; Singh
et al., 2014; Karlberg et al., 2015; Kumar et al., 2016). Nevertheless,
despite its obvious potential, many communities fail to maintain the
structures and to sustain the provision of ecosystem services over time
(Joshi et al., 2005; Bouma, 2008).
One reason is that minor irrigation dams are often common pool
resources, where there are incentives to freeride on the (e.g. main-
tenance) investments of others (Bouma, 2008; Balooni et al., 2008).
Wherever local institutions are weak, this will lead to a breakdown in
community eﬀorts to sustainably manage the infrastructure. Farmers
report that traditional institutions, norms and rules have often been
able to successfully address this challenge. Since the colonial times,
however, state interference has weakened customary rules, leading to
the gradual decline in the importance of minor irrigation dams since the
19th century (Reyes-Garcia et al., 2011; Raju and Shah, 2000;
Palanisami and Meinzen-Dick, 2001).
Globally, new community-based water management schemes are
being developed in response to similar institutional challenges (Gleick,
1998; Marshall, 2008; Campbell and Vainio-Mattila, 2003; Falk et al.,
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2009; Cox et al., 2010). In India, watershed development programs
targeting communities are being implemented by government and non-
government development actors. Water User Associations were and are
created under the Rajasthan Farmers’ Participation in Management of
Irrigation Systems Act No. 21 of 2000. They are supposed to be local
authorities that manage water and water infrastructure with local
maintenance funds. The associations are equipped with use and man-
agement rights (Government of Rajasthan (GoR, 2000; Raju and Shah,
2000). In many cases, the systems work well as long as there is strong
external facilitation (Raju and Shah, 2000). In most cases, infra-
structure maintenance collapses as soon as the projects come to an end.
There is evidence that standard mechanisms of establishing watershed
maintenance funds often negatively aﬀect the individual’s willingness
to contribute to maintenance (Bouma, 2008). Motivated by our
awareness of these challenges, we used a framed Public-Good Experi-
ment to answer our ﬁrst research question:
Research question 1. What are the current behavioral patterns among
Rajasthan water managers with regard to the management of water
harvesting infrastructure?
While the lack of understanding is one aspect of our sustainability
challenges, equally important is the need to develop adaptive capacities
to respond to social-ecological system dynamics (Pahl-Wostl et al.,
2008). The main aim of this study is to support improved management
of water harvesting infrastructure. Understanding people’s behavioral
patterns and underlying norms was our starting point to challenge them
to change behavior (Rajabu, 2007; Flood et al., 2018). More speciﬁ-
cally, we studied the potential of using behavioral experiments to fa-
cilitate social learning and innovation. This requires institutional in-
novation which can be supported by collaborative learning (Woodhill,
2010). Experimental games are known to have the potential to support
stakeholders in collaborative learning (Barreteau et al., 2001, 2003;
Gurung et al., 2006; Guyot and Honiden, 2006; Becu et al., 2008;
Meinzen-Dick et al., 2016; Flood et al., 2018). They can facilitate dia-
logue, shared learning, collective decision making and strengthen the
adaptive management capacity of local communities (Gurung et al.,
2006; Hertzog et al., 2014; Falk et al., 2016). The game setting allows
experimenting with rules and strategies. It limits the cost of trial and
error methods and shifts the approach from costly learning by doing to
learning by simulating (Barreteau et al., 2001). The games’ potential to
facilitate institutional change is strongest when they are combined with
communication (Balliet, 2010). We further acknowledge the potential
of experimental games to complement innovation systems approaches
which emphasize the co-evolution of innovation processes aligning
technical, social, institutional and organizational dimensions (Hall,
2005). The games can give valuable insights to stimulate multi-stake-
holder innovation platforms.
Our games facilitated a process of social learning which builds the
actors’ capacity to achieve joint solutions towards their goals of water
management (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2016).
Games for sustainability commonly serve two objectives: (i) create
awareness of a speciﬁc problem, and (ii) encourage players to develop
solutions (Rajabu, 2007; Hertzog et al., 2014; Flood et al., 2018). Ac-
cordingly, we created awareness among communities about the co-
operation challenges related to water management and encouraged
discussions on formulating eﬀective management rules. This should
give us
Research question 2. How can experimental games facilitate social
learning among water managers?
2. Research area and background information
Research was carried out in Bhilwara district in Rajasthan state in
India (Fig. 1). The district is situated in the Sub-Humid Southern Plain
agro-climatic zone, where average rainfall is approximately 630mm
(Government of Rajasthan (GoR, 2018). Agriculture in the district is
prone to strong climatic variations. Approximately four-ﬁfth of the
district’s population depends on agriculture. Maize, mustard, black
gram, sorghum, wheat, chilies and barley are the major crops grown. In
2016, 52 percent of Bhilwara’s total net sown area of 4359 km2 was
rainfed. Water harvesting structures irrigated only 31 km2 of agri-
cultural land while wells irrigated 2138 km2 (Government of Rajasthan
(GoR, 2018). There is, however, a link between water harvesting and
wells. Often, tanks are not directly used for irrigation but they are
critical for groundwater recharge. Poor management of water har-
vesting structures leads to widespread drying up of wells.
3. Research methodology
3.1. General approach
The research team ﬁrst visited the project area in 2015 to improve
the understanding of the challenges in water management. Focus group
discussions (FGDs) were organized in arbitrarily selected villages with
village members mobilized by the NGO partner Foundation for
Ecological Security (FES) and the local administration. The discussions
helped to clarify: (i) whether there really are coordination challenges
related to village water infrastructure, (ii) in which ﬁelds institutions
fail to address water related social dilemmas, (iii) the historical or
current rules and norms farmers refer to, (iv) types of beneﬁts perceived
in relation to the infrastructure and (iiv) the costs and beneﬁts of water
infrastructure management. Together, this information helped us to
design a game that was highly likely to support communities in de-
veloping rules to improve water infrastructure management.
We also report the results of a FGD with regional representatives of
the FES, the Department of Agriculture and progressive farmers. One of
the tasks of the FGD was to name the beneﬁts and services provided by
minor irrigation infrastructure. We asked the FGD participants to rate
the excludability and subtractability of each of the beneﬁts they had
mentioned. Excludability refers to the costs of preventing a beneﬁciary
from enjoying a beneﬁt. Subtractability describes to which degree one
beneﬁciary’s enjoyment aﬀects the possibility of other beneﬁciaries
enjoying the same beneﬁt (Ostrom, 2009; Falk et al., 2018). Sub-
stractability was rated on a three-point scale (no competition in use,
moderate competition, and strong competition). Excludability was
rated on a four-point scale (very easy to exclude others from use, easy to
exclude, diﬃcult to exclude, and very diﬃcult to exclude). Perceptions
on beneﬁts related to water infrastructure management and their
classiﬁcation were recorded using an openly accessible online diag-
nostic tool for assessing ecosystem services (cmap.icrisat.ac.in/ges).
The results of this assessment were graphically analyzed (Fig. 3).
For sampling, a list of villages in Bhilwara district was extracted
from the oﬃcial 2011 Census of the Government of India. Of a total of
316 villages, 30 with minor irrigation dams were randomly selected.
Between February and March 2016, the sample villages were visited.
Two days before the games were played, the project was introduced and
ten people who play a critical role in agriculture, water and water in-
frastructure management were mobilized. Village leaders supported in
mobilizing key community members with whom the games were
played. Table 1 summarizes socio-economic characteristics of the
sample households. Our sample was representative for rural Bhilwara in
terms of age. There was, however, an over-representation of better
educated males and an under-representation of Scheduled Caste (SC)
members. This sample bias reﬂects the social reality in the research
region, with well-educated men belonging to privileged sub-groups
being the ones mainly making decisions on water management.
In order to observe the impact of the games, 7 out of the 30 sites
were revisited in December 2017 to play the games again with com-
munity members.
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3.2. Experiment design
We replicated the dam management challenges in a simpliﬁed
manner using a framed public good experiment. We decided to focus on
the provisioning action situations on the basis of stakeholder con-
sultations. A non-linear pay-oﬀ function similar to the one in the irri-
gation games of Cardenas et al. (2008) and Janssen et al. (2011, 2012)
was used. Pay-oﬀs were adjusted to estimates of average maintenance
costs of dams as well as typical income derived from dam water based
on evaluations done by Singh et al. (2014).
At the start of each round, participants were provided with the same
initial endowment of 5000 Play Rupees. All participants decided si-
multaneously and concealed which share of this endowment they
wanted to invest in maintaining the dam. Decision cards were used for
this purpose. The accumulated individual contributions determine the
group earning as shown by an S-shaped pay-oﬀ function which was
presented throughout the game as a table poster. The group earning
was distributed equally among the players. Total earnings by an in-
dividual in a round were determined by this share of the group earnings
from the dam, plus the amount of the initial endowment not invested.
We made incentivized payments in order to improve the reliability
and validity of our games (Loomis, 2014). The accumulated individual
Play Rupee earnings were exchanged at the rate of US$ 0.015 per 1000
Play Rupees. The exchange rate was adjusted to generate expected
earnings equivalent to one day’s wages under the NREGA social em-
ployment scheme. In addition, each participant received US$ 1.10 as a
non-incentivized show-up fee which was paid out together with the
incentivized payment.
Local ﬁeld assistants were trained in facilitating the game. They
explained the rules, conducted a quiz and test rounds and recorded the
decisions on computers. The games were structured in three phases.
Firstly, ﬁve baseline rounds were played with private decisions and
without any communication. After playing these ﬁve rounds with
anonymous decisions, we revealed the players’ decision from round six
onwards. In this phase, contributions and earnings were written on a
large poster table visible to all. After each round, players could also
discuss their experience in the game. The discussion was a critical
element of our design as it allowed the players to start negotiations and
propose rules. After round ten, the facilitators chose a game variation
for each group based on its speciﬁc content of discussions. A suite of
variations was prepared based on explorative assessments and pre-tests.
The game variation was played for ﬁve additional rounds. The variation
options are summarized below:
NREGA variation: Under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act scheme, poor community members have
the guaranteed right to work for a minimum number of days per month
for a government set wage. The social employment scheme generates
income for the poor and supports public work in the interest of com-
munities. In this game variation, it is assumed that NREGA could be
directed to maintain water infrastructure. For this to happen, in-
dividuals would need to lobby this interest at the Panchayat (local
administration) level. Lobbying was costly and the game variation al-
lowed de facto to reach higher group income levels with lower in-
dividual investments.
Fig. 1. Map of the research area greater insights and will eventually support social innovation through experimental games. Hence, our second question is.
Table 1
Socio-economic attributes of the population of rural Bhilwara and those of the sample population (source: Population census of 2011 and own data).
Rural adult population of Bhilwara district Study sample
Average age 37 35
Share of population with below primary education 64 % 36 %
Share of population with above secondary education 5 % 27 %
Male/female ratio 0.99 1.77
Share of scheduled caste population 17.5% 7.3%
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Development project variation: This game variation is simulating a
common reason for poor dam maintenance. Irregular government re-
pairs discourage farmers’ collective action (Bouma, 2008). We assume
that there is a one in six chance that the government or an international
donor would be doing the maintenance work. If the donor is main-
taining the dam, the players get the whole income but the money they
have invested is gone. Nevertheless, if the donor does not step in, the
income is calculated on the basis of the group’s contribution.
Exclusion variation: After every round, the group can decide to
exclude somebody from the dam, which eventually would mean the
person loses her/his beneﬁts for this round. We took into account the
fact that it takes some eﬀort to enforce this exclusion. Therefore, if any
player gets excluded by the group, each of the other group members
will have to pay 500 Play Rupees. The practice of excluding fellow
farmers was found in one village during explorative ﬁeld visits. It was
reported that the group blocked a channel and removed a pump of a
non-compliant farmer.
In order to answer our research questions, we recorded each players’
decision during the game using entry forms on netbooks. We recorded
the summaries of the discussions and additionally counted all discus-
sion input by content categories. The latter was done on paper forms to
enable quicker recording. Analyzing the content of the discussions al-
lowed us to draw conclusions about the process and impact of social
learning in the game (Flood et al., 2018).
The complete protocol of the game can be found at
gamesforsustainability.org/India_village_dam_PG_game_ICRISAT_2016.
pdf. The data set can be accessed under dx.doi.org/10.21421/D2/
MFT8ZD.
4. Theoretical reﬂections
The maximum group earning that could be achieved in our game
design (171,000 Play Rupees) required that players collectively invest
45,000 Play Rupees. The Nash equilibrium would be, however, a
strategy wherein individual players act selﬁshly and do not invest
anything in the public good, i.e., keeping the full endowment in their
private account. Empirical evidence barely conﬁrms such theoretical
predictions. Singleton and Taylor's (1992) concept of cooperation
through “mutual vulnerability” oﬀers an explanation for contributions
above the Nash equilibrium. They deﬁne “mutual vulnerability” as “the
condition of a group of actors each of whom values something which
can be contributed or withheld by others in the group and can therefore
be used as a sanction against that actor”. In the case of water infra-
structure maintenance by Rajasthan farmers, any player can contribute
or withhold participation in cooperative infrastructure maintenance.
The withholding of cooperation is a credible threat and can be used as a
sanction.
We allowed communication as a realistic representation of the real-
life situation, where neighbouring farmers meet regularly during daily
activities. There is multiple evidence that even “cheap talk” successfully
improves the self-organization of groups (for meta-analyses, see Balliet,
2010; Chaudhuri, 2011; Janssen et al., 2014). Face-to-face commu-
nication is particularly eﬃcient to develop institutions. Communication
can further create trust as players obtain information about each other’s
values and intensions (Ostrom, 2009). It supports cooperation since it
enables receiving signals about the other’s willingness to cooperate,
creates a group identity, helps in developing joint strategies, voicing
commitments and supports developing as well as enforcing shared
norms (Balliet, 2010; Janssen et al., 2014). While it is not this study’s
objective to deepen the understanding of communication in experi-
mental games, it was introduced given its potential to support social
learning. It should be kept in mind that institutional capacity devel-
opment was the critical motivation to play the game with Rajasthan
farmers.
The transparency of individual contributions and earnings was
meant to intensify group discussions and support, and thereby the
development of rules. Moreover, in real life too, farmers are very much
aware of the contributions of fellow farmers to group investments.
There is empirical evidence that information which allows players to
estimate the level of cooperation by others aﬀects the level of co-
operation (Janssen et al., 2014). People comply with social norms be-
cause they wish their actions to be approved. Social approval or dis-
approval does not have to be explicitly expressed. Often, the actor’s
anticipation of approval or disapproval constitutes already signiﬁcant
beneﬁts or costs for her. Playing a simple public good experiment, Rege
and Telle (2004) ﬁnd evidence that people increase their cooperation
levels when their decisions are made public. Soetevent (2005) observes
that under speciﬁc conditions, church donations increase when neigh-
bors can see how much a person is donating. Panagopoulos (2010)
carried out an experiment where the names of either voters (pride
treatment) or non-voters (shame treatment) in public elections were
published in local newspapers. He ﬁnds evidence that shame in parti-
cular increased election turnouts while pride is eﬀective only for sub-
groups in society.
Introducing the NREGA game variation does not change the theo-
retical prediction of zero investment. Theory would predict that no
NREGA lobbying is done. From a group perspective, it would be ben-
eﬁcial if all players made use of the NREGA intervention and reduce
their contributions by the amount which can be saved through it.
Given the zero contribution equilibrium, the development project
game variation does not change theoretical predictions. Assuming
contributions greater than zero, we expect that contributions decrease
under this variation.
Economic theory predicts that the groups make no use of the costly
exclusion opportunity (second-order public goods). Nevertheless, from
experimental evidence, we know that participants provide such second-
order public goods even though doing so is costly (Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). The willingness to apply
costly sanctions can be explained by the concept of positive or negative
intrinsic values such as joy or regret (Ostrom, 2009). Sanctioning does
not need to produce material revenues if it is based on the intrinsic
belief in the rightness of an action (Smith, 1759). Fehr and Gächter
(2000) as well as Falk et al. (2005) also argue that whether or not
participants sanction each other is based on their motivation to harm
those who are perceived as behaving unfairly.
5. Results
5.1. Baseline results
The baseline round was the most controlled part of our game which
can be compared with results of other experiments. Average invest-
ments in the baseline phase were 2965 Play Rupees (σ=1638), which
is almost 60 percent of the individual endowments. Only 2.3 percent of
observations conformed to the Nash strategy of zero contribution.
Almost 20 percent of the observations had investment levels above
4500 Play Rupees which would lead to optimal group outcomes if all
members invested this amount. Nevertheless, the optimal group in-
vestment level was never reached in the ﬁrst round.
We estimated an OLS model explaining the investment in the very
ﬁrst decisions which had not yet been inﬂuenced by the game dy-
namics, communication or social information (Appendix A). We see
that youth, better educated people and scheduled caste members invest
more. The history of a watershed project having been implemented did
not have an impact on the decisions.
We used hierarchical Mixed-eﬀects models with standard errors
clustered by groups to analyze the game dynamics. This tool allowed us
to control for variables on diﬀerent scales. We considered individual-
context layer and group-context layer information. For individual-
context layer information, we included socio-economic indicators such
as age, education level and being a scheduled caste member. For the
group-context layer, we included whether there had been a watershed
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project implemented in the village and the social network density of
relatives in the group.
The analysis of rounds two to ﬁve (Table 2) which were undisturbed
by communication and social information revealed that only the impact
of the education level remains. More important than age, sex and caste
became the game dynamic expressed by the average investment of
other players in the previous round. At the same time, the individual
random eﬀects parameter was highly signiﬁcant indicating a high
variability in individual coeﬃcients from the mean ﬁxed eﬀects coef-
ﬁcient.
Players who played the game twice invested in the baseline round
signiﬁcantly less in 2017 than in 2016 (Mann-Whitney test z= 5.72,
Prob> |z|= 0.000, Table 2).
5.2. Introducing game variations
With the introduction of communication and revealing social in-
formation, the average investments increased to 3499 Play Rupees
(σ=1562), which is approximately 70 percent of the individual en-
dowments (Fig. 2). The optimal group investment level of 45,000 Play
Rupees was reached in 10 percent of the observations.
The models including all game rounds (Table 3) conﬁrm that the
introduction of communication and social information signiﬁcantly
increased contributions. The expectation that the government or other
donors should repair the village infrastructure was very often men-
tioned in the discussion and the development project variation was
therefore played in 10 out of 30 groups. There was no decrease in in-
vestments in this game variation.
The NREGA scheme was mentioned in at least 26 percent of the
groups during the discussions and consequently played with eight
groups. The players decreased their investments to on average 2540
Play Rupees (σ=1059). All players made 100 percent use of the
NREGA opportunity. The average earnings were highest under this
variation with a low standard deviation. What was striking was that in
more than half of the observations, players paid higher amounts than
was necessary to achieve the group optimum given that all players used
NREGA and that all players paid this “optimum” amount. Despite this,
Table 2
Hierarchical Mixed eﬀects models explaining the individual investments in the rounds without communication and social information (coeﬃ-
cients with clustered standard errors in parentheses).
Model 1 – Model 2 –
only 2016 data including 2017 data
Game round −55.13 (33.99) −53.10 (33.27)
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) −22.27 (196.79) −14.51 (171.81)
Age 6.60 (6.47) 6.55 (6.08)
ln of Education level 518.15** (175.80) 386.35* (186.63)
Watershed project implemented at site −188.36 (150.04) −133.62 (148.94)
Av. investment of other group members in previous round 0.34** (0.12) 0.30* (0.12)
Survey year (0= 2016, 1= 2017) −965.35** (344.14)
Constant 1470.03** (553.64) 1676.90** (517.46)
Site random-eﬀects parameter 4.62 (9.68) 5.29* (2.42)
Individual random-eﬀects parameter 7.02*** (0.08) 7.03*** (0.06)
Residual random-eﬀects parameter 7.05*** (0.03) 7.04*** (0.03)
Observations 1200 1289
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
Fig. 2. Boxplot of individual contributions, game earnings from dam investments and total earnings by game variations.
Fig. 3. Ecosystem services linked to minor village dams mentioned in stake-
holder meeting and classiﬁed according to the typology of goods.
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only 15 percent of the cases saw an actual overinvestment at the group
level. This indicates that a large share of the players was making extra
investments in order to compensate for expected low investments of
other group members.
The call for punishment and exclusion was strong in groups with
persistent free-riders. Wilcoxon rank-sum test conﬁrms signiﬁcantly
more frequent zero contributions in these groups before the game
variation was introduced. The variation was played in eight groups and
signiﬁcantly increased the investments. At the same time, being ex-
cluded in previous rounds made players reduce their contributions even
further rather than cooperating with the group. Rank-sum tests show no
signiﬁcant change in zero contributions before and after the exclusion
opportunity was introduced in these groups.
Better educated players made overall higher contributions but re-
duced them as soon as communication and social information was in-
troduced. We observed no impacts of other socio-economic controls on
the contributions throughout the games – apart from the aforemen-
tioned pattern for the decision in the ﬁrst round. Players who belonged
to communities where watershed projects had been implemented
showed no strong willingness to cooperate. Our models show highly
signiﬁcant random-eﬀects parameters indicating strong diﬀerences
across individuals and sites.
Moreover, an analysis of all game rounds indicates that players who
played the game twice invested signiﬁcantly less in 2017 than in 2016
(Table 3: Models 4).
5.3. Analyses of game discussion
The players intensively use of the opportunity to communicate
(Table 4). Please take into account that for instance two contributions
were counted if a player raised a complaint and proposed a rule within
one discussion statement. Arguments were most often counted, fol-
lowed by agreements to rules as well as rule proposals. The models in
Table 5 indicate that men raised their voices more often as well as
better educated and older participants. Scheduled caste members par-
ticipated equally in the discussions.
Table 3
Mixed-eﬀects regression results over all rounds explaining individual amounts invested (coeﬃcients with standard errors in parentheses.
Game variables Model 3 – only 2016 Model 4 – 2016 and 2017
Game round 17.17 (15.40) 22.26 (14.74)
Survey year (0= 2016, 1= 2017) −680.08* (298.75)
Average investment of other group members in previous round 0.17** (0.06) 0.23*** (0.07)
Game variations
Communication and social information 469.34*** (126.78) 462.48*** (114.42)
NREGA (lobbied external support) −1074.09*** (192.42) −1027.69*** (190.31)
Development project (random external support 172.91 (202.14) 86.07 (187.95)
Punish by exclusion 722.10*** (143.01) 594.71*** (145.72)
Punish by ﬁne 1093.77*** (309.50)
Frequency of being sanctioned −1056.11*** (181.45) −998.20*** (164.19)
Individual-level variables
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) 38.65 (108.03) −73.29 (115.41)
Age 2.10 (3.68) 3.79 (3.73)
ln of Education level 174.03 (94.27) 106.71 (114.92)
Member of scheduled caste −43.96 (114.17)
Group-level variables
Watershed project implemented at site −82.14 (128.99) −45.09 (133.64)
Network density of individual social relations −26.52 (38.84)
Constant 2150.83*** (288.95) 1943.52*** (257.52)
Site Random-eﬀects Parameters 5.58*** (0.30) 5.55*** (0.29)
Individual Random-eﬀects Parameters 6.33*** (0.10) 6.36*** (0.09)
Residual Random-eﬀects Parameters 7.16*** (0.03) 7.18*** (0.03)
Number of players 300 348
Observations 4300 4762
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01).
Table 4
Absolute frequency of interactions during game discussions.
Individual proposed rule 1455
Individual agreed to rule 1547
Individual rejected rule 89
Individual argued 3062
Individual praised 144
Individual complained 140
Individual proposed punishment 67
Individual proposed reward 25
Unconnected communication 278
Total interactions 6807
Table 5
Mixed-eﬀects regression results of individual contributions to the discussion by
rounds (2016 only); (coeﬃcients with standard errors in parentheses.
Model 5 Model 6
Total interactions Individual proposed
rule
Game round 0.00 (0.03) −0.01* (0.01)
Group investment in previous round −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) −0.72*** (0.18) −0.27*** (0.06)
Age 0.01 (0.01) 0.01* (0.00)
ln of Education class 0.67*** (0.19) 0.28*** (0.07)
Member of Scheduled Caste −0.54* (0.26) −0.13 (0.10)
Watershed project implemented at
site
−0.05 (0.07) 0.02 (0.02)
Network density of individual social
relations
−0.05 (0.07) 0.02 (0.02)
Constant 1.72*** (0.46) 0.30* (0.15)
Site Random-eﬀects Parameter 0.06 (0.14) −1.47*** (0.19)
Individual Random-eﬀects Parameter 0.19* (0.09) −0.73*** (0.10)
Residual Random-eﬀects Parameter 0.35*** (0.07) −0.59*** (0.06)
Number of players 300 300
Observations 3100 3100
* p < 0.1.
*** p < 0.01).
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We observed no strong impact of the game dynamics on the com-
munication patterns. The discussion content did not signiﬁcantly
change over the rounds. The models in Appendix B indicate that
whenever players agreed to rules, they were making signiﬁcantly
higher contributions and enjoyed signiﬁcantly higher earnings. Players
who proposed a punishment made higher contributions in the next
round.
We recorded only summaries of the discussions and will therefore
provide only a rough content analyses. Table 6 lists the most frequently
discussed topics. Approximately half of the communities clearly ex-
pressed a severe problem with water infrastructure maintenance. The
need to cooperate was the most often expressed response to this si-
tuation. The third most frequently made statement was the call for
government investments in community water management. At the same
time, there were many voices warning that the community will lose by
waiting for somebody else to solve their problems. There was a great
variety of institutional mechanisms mentioned ranging from the im-
portance of holding meetings, expecting the panchayat to take re-
sponsibility, making use of the NREGA social employment scheme, or
calling on the help of NGOs. Players proposed sanctions on un-
cooperative behavior in approximately half of the discussions. Histor-
ical institutional practices were mentioned in very few cases. Whatever
the institutional solution to be found, equality was a top priority value
to be taken into account.
Beyond understanding the degree to which the discussion inﬂu-
enced the game, we also wanted to estimate whether the game sup-
ported social learning. We can see that many communities acknowl-
edged the real-life problem, expressed the need to address it and
proposed solutions that are in the realm of the community.
5.4. Ecosystem service assessment
Fig. 3 shows that regional representatives of FES, the Department of
agriculture and progressive farmers named a considerable diversity of
beneﬁts related to minor irrigation infrastructure. They made speciﬁc
mention of beneﬁts in the ﬁeld of private and public goods. Doing the
same exercise with farmers produced a stronger weight towards locally
enjoyed private goods. Groundwater recharge as a commonly expected
beneﬁt from rainwater harvesting by dams (Glendenning et al., 2012)
has not been directly mentioned.
6. Discussion
Players in our game were relatively cooperative, which is common
in irrigation experiments (Janssen et al., 2011; Javaid and Falk, 2015).
They also showed the commonly observed downward trend in invest-
ments over the rounds (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Chaudhuri, 2011) even
though it was not signiﬁcant when controlling for the lag of other
players’ contributions.
Introducing social information and communication was highly ef-
fective in increasing cooperation levels. An analysis of the discussion
content shows that the players mainly used this opportunity to co-
ordinate. They certainly also received signals about other’s willingness
to cooperate (Javaid and Falk, 2015; Balliet, 2010). The later eﬀect was
strengthened through the disclosure of everybody’s contributions.
Croson and Shang (2008) found evidence that learning about other
people’s behavior inﬂuences beliefs about social norms, which thereby
aﬀects one’s own behavior. Mittone and Ploner (2011) observed that
knowing to be observed has an even stronger eﬀect. Being observed
reinforces internalized norms through moral and social enforcement
(Falk et al., 2012). Our players used the communication only to a very
limited degree to enforce rules through social sanctions. Only four
percent of the discussion contributions were related to praise or blame.
At the majority of sites, proposals for material sanctions came up
sooner or later. The groups who played the game variation where fellow
players could be sanctioned had higher overall investment levels. It
seems that the groups felt more conﬁdent with the possibility to sanc-
tion and were therefore willing to invest more. At the same time, being
sanctioned did not motivate infringers to cooperate with the rest of the
group. Additional mechanisms are needed to motivate free-riders to
cooperate. In the real world, special attention can be paid to private
good ecosystem services as excluding from their enjoyment is a
common sanctioning instrument.
At the same time, acknowledging common pool resources provided
by rainwater harvesting (Glendenning and Vervoort, 2010, 2011,
Glendenning et al., 2012) but experienced beyond the local scale in-
dicates that dam governance requires coordination at a higher scale.
This can even economically justify regular government support to
minor irrigation infrastructure maintenance.
The fact that older and better educated men contributed more
strongly to the discussion can probably be related to social norms and
perceived diﬀerentiation. It aﬀects cooperation within communities.
Our results conﬁrm the need to facilitate decision making processes
which encourage women, youth and the less educated to express and
defend their interests. The role of general education has to be empha-
sized. Less educated community members made lesser contributions in
the very ﬁrst round of the game which most strongly reﬂects inter-
nalized cooperation patterns. While we did not observe that they made
lower investments throughout the game, they participated signiﬁcantly
less in the discussion.
In response to our ﬁrst research question, it is confusing that the
high investment levels in the game did not correspond to the absent
actual investment on water infrastructure. Does this mean that our
methodology does not allow us to answer our ﬁrst research question?
The games provided valuable insights into how community members
make water management choices (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2016), espe-
cially in terms of responses to interventions and communication pat-
terns. Hertzog et al. (2014) argue that games allow players to experi-
ment with more daring actions (see also Speelman et al., 2017). They
are encouraged to think out of the box without taking any actual risk.
We also observed a few times that better educated players were ex-
traordinarily uncooperative. The team spoke to some of them after the
game. One woman explained that she wanted to use the game to de-
monstrate to the community members how they act in real life. She
used the game to play a role with the intention of encouraging dis-
cussion while the role might not have represented her actual behavioral
pattern.
Table 6
The most frequently discussed topics.
Discussion topic Absolute frequency of being mentioned
out of 30 sessions
Expressed need to cooperate 16
Proposed rule of equal maintenance contribution 15
Expressed call for external (esp. government) help 15
Stressed the importance of equity in the community 12
Proposed to sanction uncooperative community members 11
Call to ﬁnd solutions within the community rather than waiting
for external help
10
Highlighted that poor water infrastructure maintenance is a
problem in the community
9
Highlighted the need to talk about the problem 7
Drew strong parallels between the game and the real life
experience of dam maintenance
7
Related the game to other cooperation challenges but dam
maintenance
7
Expected the local government to solve the problem 6
Saw the potential to use the NREGA social employment program
to address the problem
5
Highlighted the potential of traditional practices to contribute to
solving the problem
4
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Another positive view on this is that we developed an instrument
that supported social learning. What lessons did we learn with regard to
our second research question? One way of estimating the degree of
social learning is to observe the dynamics in a game (Flood et al., 2018).
Unfortunately, we neither observed an increase in contributions over
the baseline rounds nor over the rounds when communication was al-
lowed. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2018) observed that players made higher
contributions when the games were played with them a second time a
few months later. To our great disappointment, the players in our study
contributed less during our second visit 20 months later.
Can we conclude that the players did not learn in the process? Direct
feedback is also an accepted way of measuring game impacts (Flood
et al., 2018) and many farmers opined that playing the game helped the
group recognize and collectively discuss their problems of common
water infrastructure maintenance. The discussions showed that the
players connected the game to their real-life experiences. This implies
reﬂexive learning impacts (Flood et al., 2018). They highlighted chal-
lenges but gave also examples where cooperation in the community was
working well.
Interventions related to natural resource governance require a
complexity to be eﬀective, which makes it diﬃcult to measure their
impact. For instance, while speaking about introducing a new irrigation
technology or an insurance instrument, everyone immediately under-
stands what impact this can create. On the contrary, talking about in-
stitutional change and governance is a much fuzzier space (Woodhill,
2010). Links to measurable impacts are typically indirect and happen
over long time frames. This is one reason why donors and governments
in India still focus on searching for technical water management solu-
tions (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008).
Flood et al. (2018) highlight that the impact of games on social
learning is likely to be moderate in a one-oﬀ engagement. We probably
made a contribution, but generating a strong impact calls for an ap-
proach that is embedded into a larger intervention framework
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2018). There is a need for greater clarity on how
experimental approaches in combination with other methods can eﬃ-
ciently facilitate social learning. We see, for instance, the potential to
integrate the approach into stakeholder innovation platform (IP) pro-
cesses. The games can eﬀectively trigger communities to develop gov-
ernance innovations related to common water infrastructure. The IP’s
underlying philosophy is to engage diverse actors and create synergies
to ﬁnd solutions collectively. The games could quickly visualize the
beneﬁts of cooperation to water users association (WUA) and public
and private actors and motivate them to develop governance innova-
tions. At the same time, IPs provide an ecosystem for persistently mo-
tivating members’ to collectively discuss their problems of common
water infrastructure maintenance. IPs often have broader objectives,
and low-cost facilitation tools like games are important to increase the
eﬃciency of their processes. This again is important to improve the
chances of scaling IP processes.
7. Conclusion
The relevance of our paper beyond the speciﬁc case context lies in
the lessons learnt regarding the potential of experimental games to
facilitate social learning. Our study demonstrated how experimental
games can be used to facilitate a participatory process where commu-
nities identify required governance interventions ﬁtting into their
context. It further demonstrated the importance of a communication
environment which encourages the young, the less educated and
women to actively participate in decision making. In this way the
games can bring to the table diverse power constellations in a relatively
safe space.
The participants’ discussions during the game as well as the game
dynamics indicate that people learned in the game process.
Nevertheless, our study does not tell us whether this learning actually
led to behavioral change. We see the need to make stronger eﬀorts to
measure impact of similar approaches along a theory of change. So far,
the impact of games is mainly measured in recording knowledge and
attitude changes directly after the session (Flood et al., 2018). We need
to examine whether and when this change in knowledge changes in-
stitutions, behavior and eventually improves sustainability outcomes.
At the same time, we see the danger of adapting the games in ways
which do not explore their full potential to achieve impact in order to
measure their impact in a reliable way. New methodologies are needed
to address this trade-oﬀ.
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Appendix A. OLS model explaining the individual investments in the ﬁrst round (coeﬃcients with clustered standard errors in
parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.)
Model 1 –
only 2016 data
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) −334.61 (184.56)
Age −14.63* (7.24)
ln of Education level 546.36** (172.25)
Member of scheduled caste 649.16* (314.73)
Watershed project implemented at site −98.01 (172.79)
Network density of individual social relations 87.98 (47.88)
Constant 3250.82*** (424.79)
Observations 300
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Appendix B. Mixed-eﬀects regression results over all rounds explaining individual amounts invested (coeﬃcients with standard errors in
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
Game variables Model A1; 2016 only, including discussion variables Model A2; 2016 and 2017, including discussion variables
Game round 10.92 (16.05) 13.94 (15.31)
Survey year (0= 2016, 1= 2017) −776.57* (312.22)
Average investment of other group members in previous round 0.16* (0.06) 0.21** (0.07)
Game variations
Communication 395.54** (126.73) 380.56*** (111.12)
NREGA −1120.08*** (205.35) −1069.56*** (206.34)
Development project 163.26 (208.29) 85.25 (197.89)
Punish by exclusion 685.60*** (146.00) 559.59*** (149.24)
Fine 1150.21*** (324.68)
Frequency of being sanctioned −1034.89*** (170.58) −997.11*** (148.19)
Individual-level variables
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) 41.70 (108.98) −73.37 (116.47)
Age 2.10 (3.68) 3.73 (3.77)
ln of Education level 172.03 (99.00) 104.77 (119.69)
Member of scheduled caste −46.15 (114.95)
Group-level variables
Watershed project implemented at site −99.53 (130.38) −55.30 (136.85)
Network density of individual social relations −24.53 (41.05)
Communication records in discussion before this round’s decision
Proposed rule 11.88 (35.15) 23.03 (35.33)
Agreed to rule 214.67** (68.69) 244.60*** (62.64)
Rejected rule −20.25 (112.17) 87.30 (118.60)
Argued 8.47 (32.83) 1.90 (29.22)
Proposed punishment 348.00*** (96.77) 335.09** (103.06)
Unconnected statements 262.49* (114.70) 312.12** (103.46)
Constant 2225.29*** (285.35) 2041.04*** (259.42)
Site Random-eﬀects Parameters 5.67*** (0.30) 5.65*** (0.29)
Individual Random-eﬀects Parameters 6.33*** (0.10) 6.37*** (0.09)
Residual Random-eﬀects Parameters 7.16*** (0.03) 7.17*** (0.03)
Number of players 300 348
Observations 4300 4762
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